Chapter 8

[The chapter title literally means “The Nine Variations,” but since Sūnzǐ never enumerates them, and since he has already told us (V §§ 6–11) that such departures from standard practice are essentially limitless, we have little choice but to follow Wang Hsi, who says “Nine” simply stands for an indefinitely large number. “All it means is that in war we should vary our tactics to the greatest possible degree…. I don’t know what Cao Cao takes these Nine Variations to be, but it has been suggested they are linked to the Nine Situations” — from chapter XI. This is the interpretation Chang Yu adopts. The only other possibility is that something has been lost — a hypothesis given some weight by the unusual brevity of the chapter.]

1. Sūnzǐ said: In war, the general receives his orders from the sovereign, gathers his army, and concentrates his forces.

[Repeated from VII. § 1, where it certainly fits better. It may have been inserted here only to give the chapter an opening.]

2. In difficult country, do not make camp. Where major roads cross, link up with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.

[This last situation is not one of the Nine Situations listed at the start of chapter XI, but appears later (ibid. § 43, q.v.). Chang Yu defines it as being positioned across the frontier, in enemy territory. Li Quan says it is “country lacking springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;” Jia Lin says, “country of gorges, chasms, and cliffs, with no road to advance by.”]

In confined situations, you must use cunning. In a desperate position, you must fight.

3. There are roads that must not be taken,

[“Especially those leading through narrow passes,” says Li Quan, “where ambush is to be feared.”]

armies that must not be attacked,

[More accurately, perhaps, “there are times when an army must not be attacked.” Chen Hao says: “When you see the chance to gain some advantage but cannot inflict a real defeat, hold off attacking, lest you overtax your men’s strength.”]

towns that must not be besieged,

[Cf. III. § 4. Cao Cao gives an interesting example from his own experience. When invading the territory of Xu-zhou, he bypassed the city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed deep into the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yu says: “No town should be attacked that, once taken, cannot be held, or that, if left alone, will cause no trouble.” When Xun Ying was urged to attack Bi-yang, he replied: “The city is small and well-fortified; even if I succeed in taking it, it will be no great feat of arms; but if I fail, I’ll make myself a laughingstock.” In the seventeenth century, sieges still made up a large part of warfare. It was Turenne who drew attention to the importance of marches, countermarches, and maneuvers. He said: “It is a great mistake to waste men taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will win a province.” [1]]

positions that must not be contested, commands from the sovereign that must not be obeyed.

[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for authority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Du Mu) is moved to exclaim: “Weapons are harmful instruments, strife is contrary to virtue, a military commander is the negation of civil order!” The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even imperial wishes must yield to military necessity.]

4. The general who fully grasps the advantages of varying tactics knows how to handle his troops.

5. The general who does not understand these things, though he may know the lay of the land, will be unable to put his knowledge to practical use.

[Literally, “gain the advantage of the ground,” which means not just securing good positions but exploiting natural advantages in every possible way. Chang Yu says: “Every kind of ground has its own natural features and also allows for varied planning. How can these natural features be put to use unless topographical knowledge is paired with flexibility of mind?”]

6. So the student of war who is not skilled at varying his plans, even if he knows the Five Advantages, will fail to get the best out of his men.

[Jia Lin tells us that these refer to five obvious and generally useful lines of action: “If a road is short, take it; if an army is isolated, attack it; if a town is in poor shape, besiege it; if a position can be stormed, attempt it; and if it is consistent with military operations, obey the ruler’s commands.” But there are circumstances that sometimes prevent a general from using these advantages. For instance, “a road may be his shortest route, but if he knows it is full of natural obstacles or that the enemy has set an ambush, he will not take it. A hostile force may be open to attack, but if he knows it is hard-pressed and likely to fight desperately, he will hold back,” and so on.]

7. So in the wise leader’s planning, considerations of advantage and disadvantage are blended together.

[“Whether in an advantageous or disadvantageous position,” says Cao Cao, “the opposite state should always be present in your mind.”]

8. If our expectation of advantage is tempered this way, we may succeed in carrying out the essential parts of our plans.

[Du Mu says: “If we want to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix our minds on that alone, but must also allow for the chance that the enemy may do us some harm, and factor this into our calculations.”]

9. If, on the other hand, in the middle of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.

[Du Mu says: “If I want to get myself out of a dangerous position, I must consider not only the enemy’s power to harm me, but also my own power to gain an advantage over the enemy. If these two considerations are properly blended in my thinking, I will succeed in freeing myself…. For example, if I am surrounded by the enemy and think only of escape, the weakness of my policy will encourage my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to urge my men to launch a bold counter-attack and use the advantage so gained to free myself from the enemy’s grip.” See the story of Cao Cao, VII. § 35, note.]

10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;

[Jia Lin lists several ways of inflicting this harm, some of which would only occur to the Oriental mind: “Lure away the enemy’s best and wisest men, so he is left without counselors. Plant traitors in his country, so that his government’s policy is rendered useless. Stir up intrigue and deceit, and so sow discord between the ruler and his ministers. By every cunning device, cause his men to deteriorate and his treasure to be wasted. Corrupt his morals with insidious gifts that lead him into excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by sending him beautiful women.” Chang Yu (following Wang Hsi) interprets Sūnzǐ differently here: “Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer harm, and he will submit on his own.”]

and make trouble for them,

[Du Mu, in interpreting this phrase, indicates that trouble should be created for the enemy’s “possessions,” or as we might say, “assets,” which he considers to be “a large army, a rich treasury, harmony among the soldiers, and prompt fulfillment of commands.” These give us the upper hand over the enemy.]

and keep them constantly busy;

[Literally, “make servants of them.” Du Yu says, “prevent them from having any rest.”]

hold out attractive bait, and make them rush wherever you choose.

[Meng Shi’s note offers an excellent example of the idiomatic use of: “cause them to forget bian (the reasons for acting otherwise than on first impulse), and rush in our direction.”]

11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the chance that the enemy will not come, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance that he will not attack, but on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

12. There are five dangerous faults that may affect a general: (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

[“Bravery without forethought,” as Cao Cao analyzes it, which makes a man fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yu, “must not be met with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and killed.” Cf. Wu Tzu, chap. IV at the start: “In sizing up a general, men tend to focus only on his courage, forgetting that courage is just one of many qualities a general should have. The merely brave man is inclined to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without any sense of what is wise, must be condemned.” Sima Fa likewise makes the sharp observation: “Simply going to one’s death does not bring victory.”]

(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;

[Cao Cao defines the Chinese word translated here as “cowardice” as describing the man “whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an advantage,” and Wang Hsi adds “who is quick to flee at the sight of danger.” Meng Shi gives the closer paraphrase “he who is bent on returning alive” — that is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as Sūnzǐ knew, nothing can be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. Tai Gong said: “He who lets an advantage slip will later bring real disaster on himself.” In 404 A.D., Liu Yu pursued the rebel Huan Xuan up the Yangtze and fought a naval battle with him at the island of Cheng-hong. The loyal troops numbered only a few thousand, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan Xuan, fearing the fate that awaited him if he were beaten, had a light boat tied to the side of his war-junk so he could escape at a moment’s notice if needed. The natural result was that his soldiers’ fighting spirit was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists attacked from windward with fireships, every man striving to be first into the fray, Huan Xuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage, and fled for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a similar story of Zhao Ying-qi, a general of the Jin state who during a battle with the army of Chu in 597 B.C. had a boat kept ready for him on the river, wanting in case of defeat to be the first across.]

(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;

[Du Mu tells us that Yao Xing, opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, Deng Qiang, and others, shut himself up behind his walls and refused to fight. Deng Qiang said: “Our adversary has a quick temper and is easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is bound to be our prey.” This plan was carried out, Yao Xiang came out to fight, was drawn as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s feigned flight, and was finally attacked and killed.]

(4) a sensitivity to honor that makes him vulnerable to shame;

[This shouldn’t be taken to mean that a sense of honor is really a defect in a general. What Sūnzǐ condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitivity to slanderous reports — the thin-skinned man who is stung by abuse, however undeserved. Mei Yao-chen rightly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: “The seeker after glory should be careless of public opinion.”]

(5) over-concern for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.

[Again, Sūnzǐ does not mean that the general should be careless of his troops’ welfare. All he wants to stress is the danger of sacrificing any important military advantage for the immediate comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or at best the prolongation of the war, that results. A mistaken sense of pity will often lead a general to relieve a besieged city, or reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, against his military instincts. It is now generally accepted that our repeated efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategic blunders that defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief came through the very man who set out with the firm resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to sentiment for a part. An old so