Dharma & Dao

The Art of War · Chapter 12 of 13

Chapter 12

modern paraphrase of Lionel Giles's 1910 translation

Modern paraphrase. This is an AI-generated retelling in contemporary English (model: claude-opus-4-7). It is not the Lionel Giles translation. The original is one click away.

[More than half the chapter (§§ 1-13) deals with fire, after which the author moves on to other topics.]

  1. Sūnzǐ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp;

[So says Du Mu. Li Quan says: “Set fire to the camp, and kill the soldiers” (when they try to flee the flames). Ban Chao, sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XI. § 51, note], found himself in extreme danger when an envoy from the Xiongnu [the deadly enemies of the Chinese] unexpectedly arrived. Consulting his officers, he exclaimed: “Nothing ventured, nothing gained! [1] Our only option now is to launch a fire attack on the barbarians under cover of night, when they cannot tell our numbers. Taking advantage of their panic, we’ll wipe them out completely; this will break the King’s nerve, cover us in glory, and ensure our mission succeeds.” The officers all said the matter should first be discussed with the Intendant. At this Ban Chao flew into a rage: “Today,” he cried, “our fortunes will be decided! The Intendant is a dull civilian who, upon hearing our plan, will surely panic and let everything come out. An inglorious death is no fit end for brave warriors.” All then agreed to follow him. As soon as night fell, he and his small band quickly made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing. Ban Chao ordered ten of his men to take drums and hide behind the enemy barracks, with orders to begin drumming and shouting at full force the moment they saw flames rise. The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he set in ambush at the camp gate. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, and a thunderous noise of drums and shouts arose at the front and rear of the Xiongnu, who rushed out in wild confusion. Ban Chao killed three with his own hand, while his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his retinue. The rest, more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. The next day, Ban Chao, guessing his thoughts, said with raised hand: “Although you didn’t go with us last night, Sir, I wouldn’t dream of taking sole credit for our exploit.” This satisfied Guo Xun, and Ban Chao, having summoned Guang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was gripped with fear and trembling, which Ban Chao moved to calm by issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the king’s sons as hostages, he returned to report to Dou Gu.” Hou Han Shu, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.]

the second is to burn stores;

[Du Mu says: “Provisions, fuel and fodder.” To subdue the rebellious people of Jiangnan, Gao Jiong advised Wen Di of the Sui dynasty to make periodic raids and burn their grain stores, a policy that eventually proved entirely successful.]

the third is to burn baggage-trains;

[An example given is Cao Cao’s destruction of Yuan Shao’s wagons and equipment in 200 A.D.]

the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;

[Du Mu says that the contents of “arsenals” and “magazines” are the same. He lists weapons and other equipment, bullion and clothing. Cf. VII. § 11.]

the fifth is to hurl dropping fire among the enemy.

[Du You says in the Tong Dian: “To drop fire into the enemy’s camp. The method is to light arrow tips by dipping them in a brazier, then shoot them from powerful crossbows into the enemy’s lines.”]

  1. To carry out such an attack, we must have means available.

[Cao Cao thinks this refers to “traitors in the enemy’s camp.” But Chen Hao is more likely right when he says: “We must have favorable circumstances generally, not just traitors helping us.” Jia Lin says: “We must take advantage of wind and dry weather.”]

The material for raising fire should always be kept ready.

[Du Mu suggests as fire-making material: “dry vegetable matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc.” This is the material cause. Zhang Yu says: “vessels for holding fire, and tinder for lighting fires.”]

  1. There is a proper season for attacks with fire, and special days for starting a blaze.

  2. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing, or the Cross-bar;

[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater, and Corvus.]

for all four are days when the wind rises.

  1. In attacking with fire, you should be ready to meet five possible developments:

  2. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once with an attack from outside.

  3. (2) If a fire breaks out but the enemy’s soldiers stay quiet, bide your time and do not attack.

[The main purpose of a fire attack is to throw the enemy into confusion. If that effect isn’t produced, it means the enemy is ready for us. Hence the need for caution.]

  1. (3) When the flames are at their height, follow up with an attack if practical; if not, stay where you are.

[Cao Cao says: “If you see a way, advance; but if the difficulties are too great, retire.”]

  1. (4) If you can launch a fire attack from outside, don’t wait for one to break out inside — strike at the right moment.

[Du Mu says that the earlier sections referred to fire breaking out (either accidentally or by arsonists) inside the enemy’s camp. “But,” he continues, “if the enemy is settled in a wasteland strewn with grass, or has camped in a position that can be burnt out, we must bring fire against him whenever the chance arises, rather than waiting for an outbreak within, in case our opponents themselves burn off the surrounding vegetation and ruin our plans.” The famous Li Ling once thwarted the Xiongnu leader this way. The latter, using a favorable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese general’s camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation nearby had already been burnt off. On the other hand, Bocai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in 184 A.D. by neglecting this simple precaution. “Leading a large army, he was besieging Changshe, held by Huangfu Song. The garrison was very small and a general nervousness ran through the ranks; so Huangfu Song called his officers together and said: ‘In war there are various indirect methods of attack, and numbers don’t count for everything. [The commentator here quotes Sūnzǐ, V. §§ 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have camped in the middle of thick grass that will easily burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night, they will panic, and we can make a sortie and attack them from all sides at once, matching Tian Dan’s achievement.’ [See p. 90.] That very evening a strong breeze rose, so Huangfu Song instructed his soldiers to bundle reeds into torches and stand watch on the city walls, then sent out a band of daring men who slipped through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts. At the same moment, a blaze of light flared up from the city walls, and Huangfu Song, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge that threw the rebels into confusion and sent them fleeing headlong.” [Hou Han Shu, ch. 71.]]

  1. (5) When you start a fire, be upwind of it. Do not attack from downwind.

[Zhang Yu, following Du You, says: “When you make a fire, the enemy will retreat from it; if you block his retreat and attack then, he will fight desperately, which will not help your cause.” Du Mu offers a more obvious explanation: “If the wind is from the east, start burning on the east side of the enemy, and follow up your attack from that side. If you start the fire on the east and then attack from the west, you’ll suffer just as your enemy does.”]

  1. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon dies down.

[Cf. Laozi’s saying: “A violent wind does not last the space of a morning.” (Tao Te Ching, ch. 23.) Mei Yaochen and Wang Xi say: “A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. This is the general pattern.” The observation may be accurate enough, but how this meaning is to be drawn from the text is not clear.]

  1. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days.

[Du Mu says: “We must calculate the paths of the stars, and watch for the days when wind will rise, before launching our fire attack.” Zhang Yu seems to interpret the text differently: “We must know not only how to attack our opponents with fire, but also how to guard against similar attacks from them.”]

  1. So those who use fire to support their attacks show intelligence; those who use water to support their attacks gain added strength.

  2. By means of water, an enemy may be cut off, but not stripped of all his belongings.

[Cao Cao’s note is: “We can only block the enemy’s road or divide his army, but not sweep away all his stockpiled stores.” Water can be useful, but it lacks the fearsome destructive power of fire. This, Zhang Yu concludes, is why water is dismissed in a couple of sentences while fire attack is discussed in detail. Wuzi (ch. 4) speaks of the two elements: “If an army is camped on low marshy ground where water cannot run off and where rainfall is heavy, it may be submerged by flood. If an army is camped in wild marshes thickly grown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it may be wiped out by fire.”]

  1. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win battles and succeed in attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; the result is wasted time and general stagnation.

[This is one of the most puzzling passages in Sūnzǐ. Cao Cao says: “Rewards for good service should not be delayed a single day.” And Du Mu: “If you do not seize chances to advance and reward the deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will follow.” For several reasons, however, and despite the formidable line-up of scholars on the other side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei Yaochen alone, whose words I quote: “Those who want to make sure of winning their battles and assaults must seize favorable moments when they come and not shrink from bold measures when the occasion demands — that is, they must resort to such means as attack by fire, water, and the like. What they must not do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still and merely hold on to the advantages they already have.”]

  1. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler plans well in advance; the good general cultivates his resources.

[Du Mu quotes from the San Lue, ch. 2: “The warlike prince controls his soldiers by his authority, binds them together by good faith, and makes them useful by rewards. If faith decays, there will be disruption; if rewards are inadequate, commands will not be respected.”]

  1. Do not move unless you see an advantage; do not use your troops unless there is something to be gained; do not fight unless the position is critical.

[Sūnzǐ may at times seem overcautious, but he never goes as far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the Tao Te Ching, ch. 69: “I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot.”]

  1. No ruler should send troops into the field merely to vent his anger; no general should fight a battle merely out of resentment.

  2. If it is to your advantage, advance; if not, stay where you are.

[This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel sure it is an interpolation, since it is clear that § 20 ought to follow directly on § 18.]

  1. Anger may in time turn to gladness; vexation may give way to contentment.

  2. But a kingdom once destroyed can never