Dharma & Dao

The Art of War · Chapter 10 of 13

Chapter 10

modern paraphrase of Lionel Giles's 1910 translation

Modern paraphrase. This is an AI-generated retelling in contemporary English (model: claude-opus-4-7). It is not the Lionel Giles translation. The original is one click away.

[Only about a third of this chapter (§§ 1–13) actually deals with “terrain,” a topic treated more fully in chapter XI. The “six calamities” are discussed in §§ 14–20, and the rest of the chapter is once again a string of loosely connected observations, though no less interesting for that.]

  1. Sūnzǐ said: We can distinguish six kinds of terrain: (1) accessible ground;

[Mei Yao-ch’en says: “well supplied with roads and means of communication.”]

(2) entangling ground;

[The same commentator says: “Net-like country, which entangles you if you venture into it.”]

(3) temporizing ground;

[Ground that allows you to “stall” or “delay.”]

(4) narrow passes; (5) steep heights; (6) positions far from the enemy.

[It is hardly necessary to point out the weakness of this classification. There is a strange lack of logical perception in the Chinese willingness to accept obvious overlapping categories like these.]

  1. Ground that both sides can freely traverse is called accessible.

  2. On such ground, get ahead of the enemy in occupying the high, sunny spots, and carefully guard your supply lines.

[The general sense of the last phrase is doubtless, as Tu Yu says, “not to let the enemy cut your communications.” Given Napoleon’s maxim that “the secret of war lies in the communications,” one wishes Sūnzǐ had done more here, and in I. § 10 and VII. § 11, than merely brush against this important subject. Colonel Henderson says: “The line of supply is as vital to an army as the heart is to the life of a human being. Just as a duelist who finds his opponent’s point threatening him with certain death, and his own guard out of place, must conform to his opponent’s movements and content himself with parrying, so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and he is fortunate if he does not have to change all his plans, split his force into more or less isolated detachments, and fight with inferior numbers on ground he has not had time to prepare, where defeat means not ordinary failure but the ruin or surrender of his entire army.”]

Then you will be able to fight with the advantage.

  1. Ground that can be abandoned but is hard to retake is called entangling.

  2. From such a position, if the enemy is unprepared, you can march out and defeat him. But if the enemy is ready, and you fail to defeat him, then, since you cannot return, disaster follows.

  3. When the position is such that neither side gains by moving first, it is called temporizing ground.

[Tu Mu says: “Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the situation remains deadlocked.”]

  1. On such ground, even if the enemy offers attractive bait,

[Tu Yu says, “turning their backs on us and pretending to flee.” But that is only one of the lures that might draw us out of position.]

it is best not to move, but instead to retreat, thus drawing the enemy out in turn; then, once part of his army has come forward, we can attack with advantage.

  1. As for narrow passes: if you can occupy them first, garrison them strongly and wait for the enemy.

[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, “the initiative lies with us, and by making sudden, unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy.”]

  1. If the enemy occupies a pass before you, do not pursue him if it is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.

  2. As for steep heights: if you reach them before your opponent, occupy the high, sunny spots and wait for him to come up.

[Cáo Cāo says: “The particular advantage of holding heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy.” [For the statement of this general principle, see VI. § 2.] Chang Yu tells this story about P’ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619–682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. “At night he pitched camp as usual, and it had already been fully fortified with wall and ditch, when he suddenly ordered the army to shift to a nearby hill. His officers were very displeased and loudly protested the extra strain on the men. But P’ei Hsing-chien paid no attention and had the camp moved as quickly as possible. That very night a terrific storm came on, flooding their former campsite to a depth of more than twelve feet. The astonished officers admitted they had been wrong. ‘How did you know what was going to happen?’ they asked. P’ei Hsing-chien replied: ‘From now on, just obey orders without asking unnecessary questions.’ From this we see,” Chang Yu continues, “that high, sunny ground is useful not only for fighting, but also because it is safe from disastrous floods.”]

  1. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not pursue him; instead, retreat and try to lure him away.

[The turning point of Li Shih-min’s campaign in A.D. 621 against the two rebels Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch’ung, Prince of Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao. Despite this, Tou Chien-te pressed on with his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated, and was taken prisoner. See Chiu T’ang Shu, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, and also ch. 54.]

  1. If you are stationed far from the enemy and the two armies are of equal strength, it is not easy to provoke a battle,

[The point is that we should not undertake a long, exhausting march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, “we would be worn out and our adversary fresh and ready.”]

and fighting will be to your disadvantage.

  1. These six are the principles connected with Earth.

[Or perhaps “the principles relating to ground.” But see I. § 8.]

The general who has risen to a responsible position must study them carefully.

  1. An army is exposed to six calamities that do not arise from natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. They are: (1) flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganization; (6) rout.

  2. Other things being equal, if one force is thrown against another ten times its size, the result is the flight of the smaller.

  3. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is insubordination.

[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T’ien Pu [Hsin T’ang Shu, ch. 148], who was sent to Wei in A.D. 821 with orders to lead an army against Wang T’ing-ts’ou. The entire time he was in command, his soldiers treated him with utter contempt and openly mocked his authority by riding through camp on donkeys, several thousand at a time. T’ien Pu was powerless to stop them, and when, after some months, he tried to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and scattered in all directions. Afterward the wretched man committed suicide by cutting his throat.]

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse.

[Cáo Cāo says: “The officers are eager and want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly give way.”]

  1. When senior officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own initiative out of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can judge whether he is in a position to fight, the result is ruin.

[Wang Hsi’s note is: “This means the general is angry without cause, and at the same time fails to appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; thus he stirs up fierce resentment and brings ruin crashing down on his own head.”]

  1. When the general is weak and has no authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct;

[Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: “If the commander gives his orders decisively, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without wavering, the soldiers will not hesitate to do their duty.” General Baden-Powell says, with emphasis: “The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they receive.” Compare also Wú Zǐ ch. 3: “The most fatal defect in a military leader is indecision; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation.”]

when officers and men have no fixed duties assigned to them,

[Tu Mu says: “Neither officers nor men have any regular routine.”]

and the ranks are formed in a sloppy, haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganization.

  1. When a general cannot judge the enemy’s strength, sends an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and fails to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be a rout.

[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and adds: “Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be put in the front ranks, both to stiffen the resolve of our own men and to demoralize the enemy.” Compare the primi ordines of Caesar (De Bello Gallico, V. 28, 44, etc.).]

  1. These are six ways of inviting defeat, and the general who has risen to a responsible position must note them carefully.

[See above, § 13.]

  1. The natural shape of the country is the soldier’s best ally;

[Ch’en Hao says: “The advantages of weather and season are not equal to those of ground.”]

but the ability to size up an adversary, to control the forces that produce victory, and to shrewdly calculate difficulties, dangers, and distances—this is what marks a great general.

  1. He who knows these things and applies them in battle will win; he who does not know them and does not practice them will surely be defeated.

  2. If fighting is certain to bring victory, then you must fight, even if the ruler forbids it; if fighting will not bring victory, then you must not fight, even at the ruler’s command.

[Compare VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch’in dynasty, said to have been Chang Liang’s patron and the author of the San Lueh, is credited with these words: “The responsibility for setting an army in motion must rest on the general alone; if advance and retreat are controlled from the palace, brilliant results are hardly to be expected. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country’s cause [literally, kneel down to push the chariot wheel].” This means that “in matters outside the women’s quarters, the military commander’s decision must be absolute.” Chang Yu also quotes the saying: “Decrees from the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp.”]

  1. The general who advances without seeking fame and retreats without fearing disgrace,

[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for a soldier is to retreat.]

whose only thought is to protect his country and serve his sovereign well, is the jewel of the kingdom.

[A fine summary, in a few words, of the Chinese “happy warrior.” Such a man, says Ho Shih, “would not regret his conduct even if he had to suffer punishment for it.”]

  1. Treat your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even to death.

[Compare I. § 6. Here Tu Mu paints an engaging portrait of the famous general Wu Ch’i, from whose treatise on war I have often quoted: “He wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the lowliest of his soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations in a bundle, and shared every hardship with his men. One of his soldiers had an abscess, and Wu Ch’i himself sucked out the pus. The soldier’s mother, hearing of it, began wailing and lamenting. Someone asked her, ‘Why do you cry? Your son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied, ‘Many years ago Lord Wu did the same for my husband, who never left his side afterward and eventually died fighting for him. And now that he has done the same for my son, my son too will fall in battle somewhere—I don’t know where.’” Li Ch’uan mentions the Viscount of