Chapter 3

1. Sūnzǐ said: In the practical art of war, the best outcome is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; smashing and destroying it is inferior. Likewise, it is better to capture an army intact than to destroy it, better to capture a regiment, a detachment, or a company intact than to destroy them.

[According to Sīmǎ Fǎ, an army corps nominally consisted of 12,500 men; according to Cáo Gōng, a regiment contained 500 men, a detachment anywhere between 100 and 500, and a company between 5 and 100. For the last two, Zhāng Yù gives the exact figures of 100 and 5.]

2. Therefore, to fight and win every battle is not the highest excellence; the highest excellence is breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.

[Here again, every modern strategist would agree with the old Chinese general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the surrender of the huge French army at Sedan, was achieved practically without bloodshed.]

3. So the highest form of generalship is to thwart the enemy’s plans;

[The word “thwart” may not fully capture the Chinese term, which implies not a defensive stance—content with foiling the enemy’s schemes one by one—but an active policy of counter-attack. Hé Shì puts it plainly: “When the enemy has formed a plan to attack us, we must anticipate him by striking first.”]

next best is to prevent the joining of the enemy’s forces;

[Cutting him off from his allies. Remember that Sūnzǐ, when discussing warfare, is always thinking of the many states and principalities into which the China of his day was divided.]

next is to attack the enemy’s army in the field;

[When he is already at full strength.]

and the worst policy is to besiege walled cities.

4. The rule is: do not besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.

[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted on it in 1899, and not wasted their strength outside Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, they would very likely have controlled the situation before the British were ready to mount serious opposition.]

Preparing mantlets, movable shelters, and various war implements will take three whole months;

[It isn’t entirely clear what the Chinese word translated as “mantlets” referred to. Cáo Gōng simply calls them “large shields,” but Lǐ Quán gives a better picture, saying they protected the heads of those assaulting city walls at close range. This suggests something like a ready-made Roman testudo. Dù Mù says they were wheeled vehicles used to repel attacks, but Chén Hào disputes this. See above, II.14. The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the “movable shelters” we have a fairly clear description from several commentators. They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from within, covered with raw hides, and used in sieges to move men to and from the walls in order to fill in the surrounding moat with earth. Dù Mù adds that they are now called “wooden donkeys.”]

and piling up siege mounds against the walls will take three more months.

[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy’s walls in order to spot weaknesses in the defense and to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the previous note.]

5. The general, unable to control his frustration, will hurl his men into the assault like swarming ants,

[This vivid simile from Cáo Gōng is drawn from the sight of an army of ants climbing a wall. The point is that the general, losing patience at the long delay, may launch a premature storming of the place before his siege engines are ready.]

with the result that one-third of his men are killed, while the town still holds. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.

[We are reminded of the terrible Japanese losses before Port Arthur, in the most recent siege history has recorded.]

6. So the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without fighting; he captures their cities without besieging them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy field operations.

[Jiǎ Lín notes that he only overthrows the government, doing no harm to individuals. The classic example is King Wǔ, who, after ending the Yīn dynasty, was hailed as “Father and mother of the people.”]

7. With his forces intact he will contest mastery of the Empire, and so, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.

[Because of double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of the sentence can also be read quite differently: “And so, the weapon not being blunted by use, its sharpness remains perfect.”]

This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

8. The rule in war is: if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, surround him; if five to one, attack him;

[Directly, without waiting for any further advantage.]

if twice as numerous, divide our army into two.

[Dù Mù objects to this saying; at first glance, it does seem to violate a fundamental principle of war. But Cáo Gōng gives a clue to Sūnzǐ’s meaning: “Being two to the enemy’s one, we may use one part of our army in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.” Zhāng Yù explains further: “If our force is twice as numerous as the enemy’s, it should be split into two divisions, one to engage the enemy in front, the other to fall on his rear; if he answers the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; if he answers the rear attack, he may be crushed in front.” This is what is meant by “one part used in the regular way, the other for some special diversion.” Dù Mù fails to see that dividing one’s army is simply the irregular method, just as concentrating it is the regular strategic method, and he is too quick to call this a mistake.]

9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;

[Lǐ Quán, followed by Hé Shì, paraphrases: “If attackers and attacked are equally matched, only the capable general will fight.”]

if slightly outnumbered, we can avoid the enemy;

[The reading “we can watch the enemy” is certainly an improvement on the above, but there seems to be no good authority for that variant. Zhāng Yù reminds us that the saying applies only when other factors are equal; a small numerical difference is often more than offset by superior energy and discipline.]

if quite outmatched in every way, we can flee from him.

10. Hence, though a small force may put up a stubborn fight, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.

11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is complete at every point, the State will be strong; if the bulwark is flawed, the State will be weak.

[As Lǐ Quán pithily puts it: “A gap indicates a deficiency; if the general’s ability is not perfect (that is, if he is not fully versed in his profession), his army will lack strength.”]

12. There are three ways a ruler can bring disaster on his army:—

13. (1) By ordering the army to advance or retreat without knowing that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.

[Lǐ Quán adds: “It is like tying together the legs of a thoroughbred, so that it cannot gallop.” One would naturally think of “the ruler” here as being at home, trying to direct his army’s movements from a distance. But the commentators understand the reverse, quoting Tài Gōng’s saying: “A kingdom should not be governed from outside, and an army should not be directed from within.” Of course it is true that during an engagement, or when in close contact with the enemy, the general should not be in the thick of his own troops but a little apart. Otherwise, he is liable to misjudge the overall position and give wrong orders.]

14. (2) By trying to govern an army the way he administers a kingdom, ignorant of the conditions that apply within an army. This unsettles the soldiers’ minds.

[Cáo Gōng’s note, freely translated: “The military sphere and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid gloves.” And Zhāng Yù says: “Humanity and justice are the principles for governing a state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are military rather than civil virtues for running an army.”]

15. (3) By employing his officers indiscriminately,

[That is, failing to put the right man in the right place.]

through ignorance of the military principle of adapting to circumstances. This shakes the soldiers’ confidence.

[I follow Méi Yáochén here. The other commentators refer not to the ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Dù Yòu says: “If a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be given a position of authority.” Dù Mù quotes: “The skillful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the greedy man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the greedy man is quick to seize advantages, and the stupid man has no fear of death.”]

16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal lords. This is simply bringing chaos into the army and throwing victory away.

17. Thus we know there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.

[Zhāng Yù says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if he cannot fight, he retreats and stays on the defensive. He will always win who knows when to take the offensive and when the defensive.]

(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.

[This is not merely a general’s ability to estimate numbers correctly, as Lǐ Quán and others claim. Zhāng Yù explains it better: “By applying the art of war, a smaller force can defeat a larger, and vice versa. The secret lies in an eye for terrain and in not letting the right moment slip. So Wú Zǐ says: ‘With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult ground.’”]

(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

(4) He will win who, being prepared, waits to take the enemy unprepared.

(5) He will win who has military ability and is not interfered with by the sovereign.

[Dù Yòu quotes Wáng Zǐ: “It is the sovereign’s role to give broad instructions, but the general’s to decide on battle.” There is no need to dwell on the military disasters caused by excessive interference in field operations by the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to not being hampered by central authority.]

Victory lies in knowing these five points.

[Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of victory.”]

18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the outcome of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory you gain you will also suffer a defeat.

[Lǐ Quán cites the case of Fú Jiān, prince of Qín, who in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the Jìn Emperor. When warned not to despise an enemy who could call on men like Xiè Ān and Huán Chōng, he boasted: “I have the population of eight provinces behind me, infantry and cavalry numbering a million; they could dam the Yangtze itself just by throwing their whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?” Yet his forces were soon disastrously routed at the Féi River, and he had to make a hasty retreat.]

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will lose every battle.

[Zhāng Yù said: “Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive; knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive.” He adds: “Attack is the secret of defense; defense is the planning of an attack.” It would be hard to find a better summary of the root principle of war.]