Dharma & Dao

The Art of War · Chapter 4 of 13

Chapter 4

modern paraphrase of Lionel Giles's 1910 translation

Modern paraphrase. This is an AI-generated retelling in contemporary English (model: claude-opus-4-7). It is not the Lionel Giles translation. The original is one click away.

[Cao Gong explains the Chinese meaning of this chapter’s title: “the maneuvering of two armies as they try to discover each other’s condition.” Du Mu says: “An army’s condition is revealed through its dispositions. Conceal your dispositions and your condition stays hidden, which leads to victory; reveal them and your condition becomes obvious, which leads to defeat.” Wang Xi remarks that a good general can “secure success by adapting his tactics to match the enemy’s.”]

  1. Sūnzǐ said: The skilled warriors of old first made themselves invulnerable to defeat, and then waited for the chance to defeat the enemy.

  2. Securing ourselves against defeat is in our own hands, but the chance to defeat the enemy is given by the enemy himself.

[That is, by a mistake on the enemy’s part.]

  1. So the good fighter can secure himself against defeat,

[Zhang Yu says this is done “by concealing the disposition of his troops, covering his tracks, and taking constant precautions.”]

but he cannot guarantee defeating the enemy.

  1. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.

  2. Security against defeat means defensive tactics; the ability to defeat the enemy means going on the offensive.

[I keep the sense found in a similar passage in §§ 1–3, even though all the commentators disagree with me. The reading they prefer — “He who cannot conquer takes the defensive” — is plausible enough.]

  1. Taking the defensive shows that strength is lacking; attacking shows strength to spare.

  2. The general skilled in defense hides in the deepest recesses of the earth;

[Literally, “hides under the ninth earth,” a metaphor for utmost concealment, so the enemy cannot find him.]

he who is skilled in attack strikes from the highest heights of heaven.

[Another metaphor, suggesting that he falls on his enemy like a thunderbolt, leaving no time to prepare. This is the view of most commentators.]

Thus on the one hand we protect ourselves, on the other we win a complete victory.

  1. To see victory only when it is already obvious to ordinary people is not the height of excellence.

[As Cao Gong notes, “the point is to see the plant before it sprouts” — to foresee an event before the action begins. Li Quan recalls the story of Han Xin, who, before attacking the far larger army of Zhao entrenched in the city of Cheng-an, told his officers: “Gentlemen, we will wipe out the enemy and meet again for dinner.” The officers barely took him seriously and gave a doubtful assent. But Han Xin had already worked out a clever stratagem in his mind, by which, as he foresaw, he was able to take the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary.]

  1. Nor is it the height of excellence if you fight and win and the whole empire says, “Well done!”

[True excellence, as Du Mu puts it, is “to plan secretly, to move stealthily, to foil the enemy’s intentions and frustrate his schemes, so that in the end the day is won without spilling a drop of blood.” Sūnzǐ reserves his praise for things that “the world’s coarse thumb and finger fail to plumb.”]

  1. Lifting an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;

[“Autumn hair” is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn when it begins growing fresh. The phrase is very common in Chinese writers.]

seeing the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; hearing thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

[He Shi gives real examples of strength, sharp sight, and quick hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Zhu, who could see objects no bigger than a mustard seed at a hundred paces; and Shi Kuang, a blind musician who could hear a mosquito’s footsteps.]

  1. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

[The second half literally reads “one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering.” Mei Yaochen says: “He who sees only the obvious wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks beneath the surface wins with ease.”]

  1. Hence his victories bring him neither a reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.

[Du Mu explains this well: “Since his victories are won over circumstances that never came to light, the world knows nothing of them, and he earns no reputation for wisdom; since the hostile state surrenders before any blood is shed, he gets no credit for courage.”]

  1. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.

[Chen Hao says: “He plans no unnecessary marches, devises no pointless attacks.” Zhang Yu explains the connection: “One who tries to conquer by sheer strength, however clever in pitched battles, can still be defeated on occasion; but one who can look ahead and see conditions not yet apparent will never blunder, and therefore always wins.”]

Making no mistakes is what guarantees victory, for it means defeating an enemy who is already beaten.

  1. So the skilled fighter puts himself into a position where defeat is impossible, and does not miss the moment to defeat the enemy.

[A “counsel of perfection,” as Du Mu rightly notes. “Position” need not mean only the ground the troops occupy. It includes all the arrangements and preparations a wise general makes to strengthen his army’s safety.]

  1. Thus in war, the victorious strategist seeks battle only after victory has already been won, while the one destined to defeat fights first and then looks for victory.

[He Shi unpacks the paradox: “In war, first make plans that will ensure victory, then lead your army into battle; if you skip strategy and rely on brute strength alone, victory is no longer assured.”]

  1. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law and strictly maintains method and discipline; this is what puts success within his power.

  2. As for military method, there is, first, Measurement; second, Estimation of quantity; third, Calculation; fourth, Balancing of chances; fifth, Victory.

  3. Measurement arises from Earth; Estimation of quantity from Measurement; Calculation from Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances from Calculation; and Victory from Balancing of chances.

[The four terms are not easy to distinguish clearly in the Chinese. The first seems to be the surveying and measurement of the ground, which lets us estimate the enemy’s strength and make calculations from the data; this leads to a general weighing-up or comparison of the enemy’s chances against our own, and if the latter tip the scale, victory follows. The main difficulty is the third term, which some commentators take to mean a calculation of numbers, making it nearly synonymous with the second. Perhaps the second should be understood as assessing the enemy’s general situation or condition, while the third is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Du Mu says: “Once relative strength has been settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play.” He Shi seconds this reading, but weakens it. Still, it suggests the third term is a calculation of numbers.]

  1. A victorious army facing a routed one is like a pound weight set against a single grain on the scale.

[Literally, “a victorious army is like an yi (20 oz.) weighed against a zhu (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a zhu weighed against an yi.” The point is simply the enormous advantage a disciplined force flushed with victory has over one demoralized by defeat. Legge, in his note on Mencius I.2.ix.2, makes the yi 24 Chinese ounces, correcting Zhu Xi’s claim that it equaled only 20 oz. But Li Quan of the Tang dynasty gives the same figure as Zhu Xi here.]

  1. The onrush of a conquering force is like pent-up waters bursting into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions.