Dharma & Dao

The Art of War · Chapter 2 of 13

Chapter 2

modern paraphrase of Lionel Giles's 1910 translation

Modern paraphrase. This is an AI-generated retelling in contemporary English (model: claude-opus-4-7). It is not the Lionel Giles translation. The original is one click away.

[Cao Gong notes: “Anyone who wants to fight must first count the cost,” which prepares us for the realization that this chapter is not about what the title might suggest, but is mainly a discussion of ways and means.]

  1. Sunzi said: When you put into the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand soldiers in armor,

[The “swift chariots” were lightly built and, according to Zhang Yu, used for attack; the “heavy chariots” were heavier and designed for defense. Li Quan, it is true, says the latter were light, but this seems unlikely. It is interesting to note the parallels between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In both cases, the war-chariot was the central element, forming the core around which a certain number of foot-soldiers were grouped. As for the numbers given here, we are told that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided into a thousand battalions, each made up of two chariots and a hundred men.]

with enough provisions to carry them a thousand li,

[2.78 modern li make up a mile. The length may have shifted slightly since Sunzi’s time.]

the expenses at home and at the front—including entertaining envoys, minor items like glue and paint, and money spent on chariots and armor—will come to a thousand ounces of silver a day. That is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

  1. When you actually engage in battle, if victory takes a long time to arrive, the men’s weapons will grow dull and their morale will fade. If you besiege a town, you will wear out your strength.

  2. Further, if the campaign drags on, the state’s resources will not be able to bear the strain.

  3. Now, once your weapons are dull, your morale faded, your strength used up, and your treasury empty, other rulers will rise up to take advantage of your weakness. At that point, no one, however wise, will be able to prevent what follows.

  4. So although we have heard of foolish haste in war, we have never seen cleverness paired with long delays.

[This terse and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the commentators. Cao Gong, Li Quan, Meng Shi, Du You, Du Mu, and Mei Yaochen all say in effect that a general, though naturally dull-witted, may still win through sheer speed. He Shi says: “Haste may be stupid, but at least it conserves energy and treasure; drawn-out operations may be very clever, but they bring disaster in their wake.” Wang Xi dodges the difficulty by remarking: “Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being drained, an empty treasury, and suffering among the people; true cleverness guards against such disasters.” Zhang Yu says: “As long as victory can be won, foolish haste is better than clever dawdling.” Now Sunzi says nothing at all—except perhaps by implication—about reckless haste being better than ingenious but lengthy operations. What he says is something much more cautious: that while speed may sometimes be unwise, slowness is never anything but foolish, if only because it impoverishes the nation. In thinking about the point Sunzi raises here, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator inevitably comes to mind. That general deliberately pitted Rome’s endurance against that of Hannibal’s isolated army, because it seemed to him that Hannibal was more likely to suffer in a long campaign on foreign ground. But it is quite an open question whether his tactics would have succeeded in the long run. Reversing them did lead to Cannae, but that only creates a negative presumption in their favor.]

  1. There is no example of a country profiting from prolonged warfare.

  2. Only someone who is fully acquainted with the evils of war can fully understand how to wage it profitably.

[That is, with speed. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can grasp the supreme importance of bringing it to a quick end. Only two commentators seem to favor this reading, but it fits the logic of the context well, whereas the alternative—“He who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits”—is decidedly pointless.]

  1. The skilled soldier does not call up a second draft, nor does he load his supply wagons more than twice.

[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time waiting for reinforcements, nor will he send his army back for fresh supplies, but will cross the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem a bold policy to recommend, but for all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time—being just a step ahead of your opponent—has counted for more than either superior numbers or the most careful calculations about supply.]

  1. Bring war materials with you from home, but forage on the enemy. That way the army will have enough to eat.

[The Chinese word translated here as “war material” literally means “things to be used,” and is meant in the broadest sense. It covers all of an army’s equipment, aside from food.]

  1. A poor state treasury forces an army to be supplied from far away. Supplying an army at a distance impoverishes the people.

[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with what follows, although it is clearly meant to. The arrangement is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may be needed to make sense of it, and we get no help from them there. The Chinese words Sunzi uses to indicate the cause of the people’s impoverishment clearly refer to some system in which farmers sent their grain contributions directly to the army. But why should the burden fall on them in this way, unless the state or government is too poor to bear it?]

  1. On the other hand, the nearness of an army causes prices to rise, and high prices drain the people’s wealth.

[Wang Xi says the high prices occur before the army has even left its own territory. Cao Gong takes it to refer to an army that has already crossed the frontier.]

  1. When their wealth is drained, the peasants will be burdened with heavy taxes.

13, 14. With this loss of wealth and exhaustion of strength, people’s homes will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be lost;

[Du Mu and Wang Xi agree that the people are deprived not of 3/10 but of 7/10 of their income. But this is hard to get from our text. He Shi adds a characteristic note: “Since the people are seen as the essential part of the state, and food as the people’s heaven, isn’t it right that those in authority should value and take care of both?”]

while government spending on broken chariots, worn-out horses, breastplates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, draft oxen, and heavy wagons will amount to four-tenths of total revenue.

  1. So a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is worth twenty of one’s own, and likewise one picul of his fodder is worth twenty from one’s own stores.

[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting a single cartload to the front. A picul is a unit of measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).]

  1. Now, in order to kill the enemy, our men must be stirred to anger; for there to be advantage in defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

[Du Mu says: “Rewards are necessary to make the soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy; so when you capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men will have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account.”]

  1. So in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been captured, those who took the first should be rewarded. Our own flags should be put up in place of the enemy’s, and the chariots mixed in and used together with ours. Captured soldiers should be treated well and kept.

  2. This is called using the defeated enemy to increase one’s own strength.

  3. In war, then, let your main goal be victory, not lengthy campaigns.

[As He Shi remarks: “War is not a thing to be trifled with.” Sunzi here repeats the main lesson this chapter is meant to drive home.]

  1. So it can be seen that the leader of armies holds the people’s fate in his hands, and the nation’s peace or peril depends on him.