Dharma & Dao

The Art of War · Chapter 7 of 13

Chapter 7

modern paraphrase of Lionel Giles's 1910 translation

Modern paraphrase. This is an AI-generated retelling in contemporary English (model: claude-opus-4-7). It is not the Lionel Giles translation. The original is one click away.

  1. Sūnzǐ said: In war, the general receives his orders from the ruler.

  2. After assembling an army and gathering his forces, he must blend and harmonize its various elements before setting up camp.

[Zhāng Yù says: “establishing harmony and trust between the higher and lower ranks before going into the field;” and he cites a saying of Wúzǐ (ch. 1, opening): “Without harmony in the state, no military campaign can be launched; without harmony in the army, no battle line can be formed.” In a historical romance, Sūnzǐ is shown saying to Wǔ Yuán: “As a general rule, those who wage war should resolve all their domestic troubles before going out to attack the foreign enemy.”]

  1. Next comes tactical maneuvering, than which nothing is more difficult.

[I have departed slightly from the traditional reading of Cáo Gōng, who says: “From the time of receiving the sovereign’s orders until our encampment facing the enemy, the tactics to follow are the most difficult.” It seems to me that the tactics or maneuvers can hardly be said to begin until the army has marched out and made camp, and Qián Hào’s note supports this view: “For raising, concentrating, harmonizing, and entrenching an army there are plenty of old rules to follow. The real difficulty arises when tactical operations begin.” Dù Yòu also notes that “the great difficulty is to be ahead of the enemy in seizing a favorable position.”]

The difficulty of tactical maneuvering lies in turning the roundabout into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

[This sentence is one of those highly condensed and somewhat enigmatic expressions Sūnzǐ is so fond of. Cáo Gōng explains it this way: “Make it look as though you are far away, then cover the distance quickly and arrive before your opponent.” Dù Mù says: “Deceive the enemy so that he is careless and unhurried while you race forward at top speed.” Hé Shì gives a slightly different twist: “Even if you must traverse difficult ground and overcome natural obstacles, this drawback can be turned to actual advantage by speed of movement.” Striking examples of this maxim are the two famous crossings of the Alps—Hannibal’s, which put Italy at his mercy, and Napoleon’s two thousand years later, which led to the great victory at Marengo.]

  1. So, to take a long and roundabout route, after luring the enemy out of the way, and—though starting later—still manage to reach the goal before him: this shows knowledge of the trick of deviation.

[Dù Mù cites the famous march of Zhào Shē in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of Ēyǔ, which was closely besieged by a Qín army. The King of Zhào first asked Lián Pō whether a relief was advisable, but Lián thought the distance too great and the country between too rugged. The king then turned to Zhào Shē, who admitted the march would be hazardous but finally said: “We shall be like two rats fighting in a hole—the braver one will win!” So he left the capital with his army, but after only 30 lǐ he stopped and began throwing up entrenchments. For 28 days he kept strengthening his fortifications, making sure that spies carried the news to the enemy. The Qín general was delighted, attributing his opponent’s slowness to the fact that the besieged city was in the Hán state, not actually part of Zhào territory. But as soon as the spies had left, Zhào Shē began a forced march lasting two days and one night, arriving on the scene with such astonishing speed that he was able to occupy a commanding position on “North Hill” before the enemy had any inkling of his movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Qín forces, who had to lift the siege of Ēyǔ in haste and retreat across the border.]

  1. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined crowd, most dangerous.

[I follow the reading of the Tōngdiǎn, Zhèng Yǒuxián, and the Túshū, since they seem to give the precise nuance needed to make sense. Commentators using the standard text take this line to mean that maneuvers may be profitable or dangerous, depending on the general’s ability.]

  1. If you set a fully equipped army on the march to seize an advantage, the chances are you will arrive too late. On the other hand, to send out a flying column for the purpose means sacrificing its baggage and stores.

[Part of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I offer my own rendering without much confidence, being convinced that there is some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear that Sūnzǐ does not approve of a long march undertaken without supplies. Cf. below, § 11.]

  1. So if you order your men to roll up their armor and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance,

[The ordinary day’s march, according to Dù Mù, was 30 lǐ; but on one occasion, while pursuing Liú Bèi, Cáo Cāo is said to have covered the incredible distance of 300 lǐ in twenty-four hours.]

doing a hundred lǐ to snatch an advantage, the commanders of all three of your divisions will fall into the enemy’s hands.

  1. The stronger men will be in front, the exhausted ones will lag behind, and by this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.

[The lesson, as Cáo Gōng and others point out, is: Don’t march a hundred lǐ for a tactical advantage, with or without baggage. Maneuvers of this kind should be limited to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: “The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the dangers of battle.” He did not often call on his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was essential, that he sacrificed everything to speed. [1]]

  1. If you march fifty lǐ to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the commander of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.

[Literally, “the leader of the first division will be torn away.”]

  1. If you march thirty lǐ with the same goal, two-thirds of your army will arrive.

[The Tōngdiǎn adds: “From this we may know the difficulty of maneuvering.”]

  1. So we may say that an army without its baggage train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without supply bases it is lost.

[I think Sūnzǐ meant “stores accumulated in depots.” But Dù Yòu says “fodder and the like,” Zhāng Yù says “goods in general,” and Wáng Xī says “fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc.”]

  1. We cannot enter into alliances until we know the designs of our neighbors.

  2. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the lay of the land—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and cliffs, its marshes and swamps.

  3. We cannot turn natural advantages to account unless we use local guides.

[§§ 12–14 are repeated in chap. XI, § 52.]

  1. In war, practice deception, and you will succeed.

[In Turenne’s tactics, deceiving the enemy—especially about the numerical strength of his troops—played a very prominent role. [2]]

Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained.

  1. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops must be decided by circumstances.

  2. Let your speed be that of the wind,

[The simile is doubly fitting, because the wind is not only swift but, as Méi Yáochén points out, “invisible and leaves no tracks.”]

your compactness that of the forest.

[Mèng Shì comes closer to the mark in his note: “When marching slowly, order and ranks must be maintained”—as a guard against surprise attacks. But natural forests do not grow in rows, though they generally possess the quality of density or compactness.]

  1. In raiding and plundering, be like fire,

[Cf. Shī Jīng, IV. 3. iv. 6: “Fierce as a blazing fire which no one can check.”]

in immovability, like a mountain.

[That is, when holding a position the enemy is trying to dislodge you from—or, as Dù Yòu says, when he is trying to lure you into a trap.]

  1. Let your plans be as dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

[Dù Yòu quotes a saying of Tài Gōng that has become a proverb: “You cannot shut your ears to thunder or your eyes to lightning—so quick are they.” In the same way, an attack should be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.]

  1. When you plunder a countryside, divide the spoils among your men;

[Sūnzǐ wants to curb the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by insisting that all booty be pooled, then fairly divided among everyone.]

when you capture new territory, parcel it out for the benefit of the soldiers.

[Chén Hào says: “Quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow and plant it.” It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they invaded, that the Chinese managed to carry out some of their most memorable and successful campaigns, such as that of Bān Chāo, who reached the Caspian, and, more recently, those of Fú Kāng’ān and Zuǒ Zōngtáng.]

  1. Think things through carefully before you make a move.

[Zhāng Yù quotes Wèi Liáozǐ as saying we should not break camp until we have gauged the enemy’s strength and the opposing general’s cleverness. Cf. the “seven comparisons” in I. § 13.]

  1. He will win who has mastered the trick of deviation.

[See above, §§ 3, 4.]

Such is the art of maneuvering.

[With these words, the chapter would naturally end. But there now follows a long appendix in the form of an extract from an earlier book on war, now lost, but apparently still in existence when Sūnzǐ wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different from Sūnzǐ’s own, and no commentator doubts its authenticity.]

  1. The Book of Army Management says:

[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators tell us anything about this work. Méi Yáochén calls it “an ancient military classic,” and Wáng Xī “an old book on war.” Given the enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sūnzǐ’s time among the various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been compiled and written down at some earlier period.]

On the field of battle,

[Implied, though not actually stated in the Chinese.]

the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the use of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the use of banners and flags.

  1. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means by which the ears and eyes of the army can be focused on a single point.

[Zhāng Yù says: “If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the same object, the maneuvers of as many as a million soldiers will be like those of a single man.”!]

  1. The army thus forming a single united body, the brave cannot advance alone, nor can the cowardly retreat alone.

[Zhāng Yù quotes the saying: “Equally guilty are those who advance against orders and those who retreat against orders.” Dù Mù tells a story in this connection of Wú Qǐ, when he was fighting against the Qín state. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of unmatched daring, rushed out by himself, took two enemy heads, and returned to camp. Wú Qǐ had the man immediately executed, whereupon an officer dared to object, saying: “This man was a good soldier and should not have been beheaded.” Wú Qǐ replied: “I fully believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he acted without orders.”]

This is the art of handling large bodies of men.

  1. So in night fighting, make heavy use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of directing the ears and eyes of your army.

[Chén Hào refers to Lǐ Guāngbì’s night ride to Héyáng at the head of 500