Chapter 11

1. Sūnzǐ said: The art of war recognizes nine kinds of ground: (1) dispersive ground; (2) easy ground; (3) contested ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.

2. When a ruler is fighting inside his own territory, that is dispersive ground.

[It is called this because the soldiers, being close to home and longing to see their wives and children, are apt to take any chance during a battle to scatter in every direction. “On the advance,” notes Tu Mu, “they will lack the courage of desperation, and on the retreat they will find places of refuge.”]

3. When he has crossed into hostile territory but not very far, that is easy ground.

[Li Quan and He Shi say “because retreat is easy,” and the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu remarks: “Once your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges to make it clear to everyone that there is no going home.”]

4. Ground whose possession gives a great advantage to either side is contested ground.

[Tu Mu defines this as ground “to be fought for.” Cao Cao says: “ground where the few and weak can defeat the many and strong,” such as “the neck of a pass,” cited by Li Quan. Thermopylae was of this kind, because even holding it for a few days meant tying down the whole invading army and gaining priceless time. Compare Wúzǐ, ch. V: “For those who must fight at odds of one to ten, nothing is better than a narrow pass.” When Lü Guang was returning in 385 A.D. from his triumphant campaign in Turkestan and had reached Yihe loaded with spoils, Liang Xi, administrator of Liangzhou, took advantage of the death of Fu Jian, King of Qin, and plotted to bar his entry into the province. Yang Han, governor of Gaochang, advised him: “Lü Guang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and full of fight. If we oppose him in the shifting desert sands, we cannot match him; we must try a different plan. Let us hurry to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Gaowu pass, cutting him off from water, and when his troops are crippled by thirst we can dictate terms without lifting a finger. Or, if that pass seems too far, we could stand against him at the nearer Yiwu pass. The cunning and resourcefulness of Zifang himself would be wasted against the enormous strength of these two positions.” Liang Xi refused to follow this advice and was swept away by the invader.]

5. Ground on which each side has freedom of movement is open ground.

[There are various readings of the Chinese term. Cao Cao says it means “ground covered with a network of roads,” like a chessboard. He Shi suggested: “ground where communication is easy.”]

6. Ground that is the key to three neighboring states,

[Cao Cao defines this as: “Our country bordering the enemy’s, and a third country bordering both.” Meng Shi cites the small principality of Zheng, bordered to the northeast by Qi, to the west by Jin, and to the south by Chu.]

so that whoever occupies it first commands most of the empire,

[The belligerent who holds this dominant position can force most of them into alliance with him.]

is ground of intersecting highways.

7. When an army has pushed into the heart of hostile country, leaving fortified cities behind it, that is serious ground.

[Wang Xi explains the name by saying that “when an army has reached such a point, its situation is serious.”]

8. Mountain forests,

[Or simply “forests.”]

rugged slopes, marshes and swamps—any country that is hard to cross: this is difficult ground.

9. Ground reached through narrow gorges, from which the only retreat is by twisting paths, so that a small enemy force could crush a large one of ours: this is hemmed-in ground.

10. Ground where we can be saved from destruction only by fighting without delay is desperate ground.

[The situation, as Cao Cao pictures it, is much like “hemmed-in ground” except that here escape is no longer possible: “a tall mountain in front, a large river behind, no way to advance, no way to retreat.” Chen Hao says: “to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like sitting in a leaking boat or huddling in a burning house.” Tu Mu quotes Li Jing’s vivid account of an army caught in such a trap: “Suppose an army invades hostile territory without local guides: it falls into a fatal trap and lies at the enemy’s mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a path so dangerous that horses must be roped together and chariots carried in slings, no way open in front, retreat cut off behind, no choice but single file. Then, before we can deploy in battle order, the enemy in overwhelming strength appears on the scene. Advancing, we can find no breathing-space; retreating, we have no refuge. We try for a pitched battle in vain, yet on the defensive none of us has a moment’s rest. If we simply hold our ground, whole days and months crawl past; the moment we move, we have to face attacks front and rear. The country is wild, with no water and no plants; the army lacks necessities, the horses are spent and the men exhausted; all strength and skill are useless; the pass is so narrow that one defender can hold off ten thousand; the enemy holds every offensive advantage, every point of vantage already lost by us. In this terrible plight, even the most valiant soldiers and the keenest weapons could be of no use.” Students of Greek history may be reminded of the dreadful end of the Sicilian expedition and the agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demosthenes. [See Thucydides, VII.78ff.]]

11. Therefore, on dispersive ground, do not fight. On easy ground, do not halt. On contested ground, do not attack.

[Rather, throw all your energy into seizing the advantageous position first. So Cao Cao. Li Quan and others, however, suppose this means that the enemy has already gotten there first, and that it would be madness to attack. In the Sūnzǐ Xulu, when the King of Wu asks what to do in such a case, Sūnzǐ replies: “The rule for contested ground is that whoever holds it has the advantage. If the enemy has secured such a position first, do not attack him. Lure him away by pretending to flee—show your banners and beat your drums—dash for other places he cannot afford to lose—drag brushwood and raise dust—confuse his eyes and ears—detach a body of your best troops and place them secretly in ambush. Then your opponent will sally out to the rescue.”]

12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s path.

[Because the attempt would be futile and would expose the blocking force itself to serious risk. There are two readings here. I follow Zhang Yu’s. The other is suggested by Cao Cao’s brief note: “Draw closer together”—that is, see that no part of your own army is cut off.]

On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.

[Or perhaps, “form alliances with neighboring states.”]

13. On serious ground, gather supplies by foraging.

[Li Quan has this charming note: “When an army penetrates deep into enemy country, care must be taken not to alienate the people by injustice. Follow the example of the Han Emperor Gaozu, whose march into Qin territory was marked by no violation of women or looting. [Note: this was in 207 B.C., and may well make us blush for the Christian armies that entered Beijing in 1900 A.D.] So he won every heart. In this passage, then, I believe the true reading must be not ‘plunder’ but ‘do not plunder.’” Alas, the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment here. Tu Mu has no such illusions: “When encamped on ‘serious ground,’ with no inducement to advance further and no possibility of retreat, one should prepare for a long defense by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the enemy.”]

On difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.

[Or, as in VIII.§2, “do not encamp.”]

14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.

[Cao Cao says: “Try some unusual trick”; and Tu Yu elaborates: “In such a position, some scheme must be devised to fit the circumstances, and if we can manage to delude the enemy, the peril may be escaped.” This is precisely what happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the road to Casilinum and apparently trapped by the dictator Fabius. Hannibal’s stratagem to outwit his foes was remarkably like the one Tian Dan had used successfully exactly 62 years earlier. [See IX.§24, note.] When night came, bundles of twigs were tied to the horns of about 2000 oxen and lit on fire, and the terrified animals were quickly driven along the mountainside toward the passes that the enemy was guarding. The strange sight of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed the Romans that they pulled back from their position, and Hannibal’s army passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III.93-94; Livy, XXII.16-17.]

On desperate ground, fight.

[For, as Jia Lin says: “If you fight with all your might, there is a chance of life; whereas death is certain if you cling to your corner.”]

15. Those called skillful commanders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy’s front and rear;

[More literally, “cause front and rear to lose touch with each other.”]

to prevent cooperation between his large and small divisions; to keep the good troops from rescuing the bad, and the officers from rallying their men.

16. When the enemy’s troops were scattered, they kept them from regrouping; even when they were united, they kept them in disorder.

17. When it was to their advantage, they moved forward; when not, they stood still.

[Mei Yaochen links this with what came before: “Having succeeded in throwing the enemy into disorder, they would press forward to seize any advantage to be had; if there was none, they would stay where they were.”]

18. If asked how to deal with a great army in orderly formation, on the point of marching to attack, I would say: “Begin by seizing something the enemy holds dear; then he will be at your mercy.”

[Opinions differ on what Sūnzǐ had in mind. Cao Cao thinks it is “some strategic advantage the enemy is relying on.” Tu Mu says: “The three things an enemy is anxious to do, and on which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our favorable positions; (2) to ravage our farmland; (3) to guard his own supply lines.” Our aim, then, must be to thwart these three plans and so make him helpless. [Compare III.§3.] By boldly taking the initiative this way, you immediately put the other side on the defensive.]

19. Speed is the essence of war:

[According to Tu Mu, “this is a summary of leading principles in warfare,” and he adds: “These are the deepest truths of military science, and the general’s chief business.” The following stories, told by He Shi, show the importance two of China’s greatest generals attached to speed. In 227 A.D., Meng Da, governor of Xincheng under the Wei Emperor Wendi, was contemplating defection to the House of Shu, and had begun corresponding with Zhuge Liang, Prime Minister of that state. The Wei general Sima Yi was then military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Da’s treachery, he set off at once with an army to forestall the revolt, having first put Meng Da off the scent with a smooth, friendly message. Sima’s officers came to him and said: “If Meng Da has joined with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we move.” Sima Yi replied: “Meng Da is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and before he throws off his mask.” Then, by a series of forced marches, he brought his army to the walls of Xincheng within eight days. Now Meng Da had previously written to Zhuge Liang: “Wan is 1200 li from here. When news of my revolt reaches Sima Yi, he will at once inform his master, but a whole month will pass before any action can be taken, and by then my city will be well fortified. Besides, Sima Yi himself is sure not to come